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Climate risks pose a threat to the function of the global food system and therefore also a
hazard to the global financial sector, the stability of governments, and the food security
and health of the world’s population. This paper presents a method to assess plausible
impacts of an agricultural production shock and potential materiality for global insurers.
A hypothetical, near-term, plausible, extreme scenario was developed based upon modules
of historical agricultural production shocks, linked under a warm phase El Niño-Southern
Oscillation (ENSO) meteorological framework. The scenario included teleconnected floods
and droughts in disparate agricultural production regions around the world, as well as
plausible, extreme biotic shocks. In this scenario, global crop yield declines of 10% for
maize, 11% for soy, 7% for wheat and 7% for rice result in quadrupled commodity prices
and commodity stock fluctuations, civil unrest, significant negative humanitarian conse-
quences and major financial losses worldwide. This work illustrates a need for the scientific
community to partner across sectors and industries towards better-integrated global data,
modeling and analytical capacities, to better respond to and prepare for concurrent agricul-
tural failure. Governments, humanitarian organizations and the private sector collectively
may recognize significant benefits from more systematic assessment of exposure to agri-
cultural climate risk.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Climate change presents significant risk to global agricultural systems, including warming and shifts in precipitation pat-
terns (Adams et al., 1998; Fedoroff et al., 2010; Rosenzweig et al., 2014), which has already started affecting the production
of major crops (Dai et al., 2004; Lobell et al., 2011; Lobell and Field, 2007). Extreme weather events pose considerable risks
for global food production; droughts and floods, in particular, can reduce agricultural productivity in affected areas (Dai,
2011; Postel, 1998; Rosenzweig et al., 2002). Biotic pressures such as pathogens and insects reduce yields and are likely
to become increasingly challenging in the future (Juroszek and von Tiedemann, 2013; Kamenidou et al., 2013; Luck et al.,
2011; Porter et al., 1991; Sutherst, 1991). Precipitation and temperature extremes have already been linked to climate
change (Coumou and Rahmstorf, 2012) and are increasing in frequency and intensity (Alexander et al., 2006; Coumou
et al., 2013; Easterling et al., 2000; Groisman et al., 2005; Klein Tank et al., 2006), a phenomenon that is visible at the decadalory, One
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Meehl and Tebaldi, 2004; Sheffield and Wood, 2007), because relatively small changes in mean temperature can result in
relatively large increases in the frequency of extreme events (Mearns et al., 1984; Rosenzweig et al., 2001; Trenberth,
2012). Interruptions to the global food system are likely to have strong reverberating impacts upon global human health,
and on economies and geopolitics in both the developed and developing world. In addition, global sensitivities to food sys-
tem interruptions are expected to worsen as population grows, markets become more linked across the world, political fra-
gility intensifies in various regions, and food systems continue to receive less investment than required (Challinor et al.,
2010; Comenetz and Caviedes, 2002; Fraser et al., 2005; Godfray et al., 2010; Nelson et al., 2014).
Agricultural climate risk is increasingly recognized as a significant problem not just for industrialized agricultural produc-
ers, but for other stakeholders including underwriters and insurers (Maynard et al., 2013), smallholder farmers and vulner-
able populations (Headey and Fan, 2008, 2010; Rurinda et al., 2014; Seaman et al., 2014), governments (Kraemer, 2014;
McElroy and Baker, 2014), the financial sector, distributors processors and shippers, and other stakeholders. Despite the pos-
sible immediacy and potential magnitude of agricultural production failures, the current state of the science to describe and
quantify probabilities of specific risks, implications and relevant uncertainties is still nascent (Dai, 2011; Jayanti and Husak,
2013; Naylor et al., 2007; Rosenzweig et al., 2014), further limited by lack of reliable data and other constraints (Müller,
2011; Devarajan, 2013; Fraser et al., 2005; Headey, 2011; Jayanti and Husak, 2013; Jerven, 2014; Maynard et al., 2013;
Nelson et al., 2014; Sachs et al., 2010).
This paper presents the results of a partnership between scientific researchers and the insurance sector to explore the
plausible impacts of agricultural system disturbances through the development of a multiple-crop production shock sce-
nario. The scenario is based on work done for the Lloyd’s of London Emerging Risk Report 2015, Innovation Series: Food Sys-
tem Shock – The Insurance Impacts of Acute Disruption to the Global Food Supply (Maynard, 2015). The scenario is set
within one calendar year in a theoretical near future. The scenario does not attempt prediction of specific outcomes, rather
proposes a plausible yet extreme confluence of hypothetical events.2. Methods
To better elucidate agricultural climate risk implications for insurers and underwriters, Lloyd’s of London commissioned a
hypothetical shock scenario wherein plausible, largely weather-driven events result in a major global shortfall in agricultural
production, with follow-on financial, geopolitical and societal effects. Insurers employ a 1-in-200 year regulatory require-
ment for hypothetical disasters ranging from market shocks, to rioting and unrest to terrorist acts (Heath et al., n.d.;
Smillie et al., 2014; von Bomhard, 2010); this 1-in-200 year ‘‘rare but plausible” reference point provides a scale by which
to stress-test one-year exposure to liability for a variety of events, so the industry can backstop their disaster risk exposure
with appropriate precautions such as minimum capital requirements (Clarke et al., 2012; Heath et al., n.d.; Michel-Kerjan
and Morlaye, 2008).
Lloyd’s of London is a major insurance marketplace based in the United Kingdom, with a regulatory function requiring the
production of scenarios to categorize and quantify exposure to an array of different plausible mega-risks, and to make those
risks known and available to insurers worldwide. This scenario constitutes a first attempt to assess whether such risks are
material to the insurance sector. Insurers and underwriters are increasingly cognizant of exposure to agricultural risk
through a variety of potentially significant claims beyond conventional agricultural risk across many classes of insurance,
such as terrorism and political violence, aviation and marine, political risk, business interruption, environmental liability,
and product liability and recall (Maynard et al., 2013). The range of these claims is far broader and more systemic than cur-
rently reflected or regulated because of the obvious global and interconnected natures of markets, finance, agricultural and
climatic systems (Goodwin and Hungerford, 2015; Miranda and Glauber, 1997; Xu et al., 2010).
Among the many approaches to scenario development (e.g., Schoemaker, 1995), the insurance sector requires a test to
establish whether a particular shock is formally material at an annual average return of at least 1-in-200. Given that most
scenario techniques focus on developing future visions that are possible or likely given a set of pre-conditions, even if the
scenarios are used to test the extremes of these pre-conditions, the insurance sector uses expert ‘best guess.’ In this study,
plausibility was established by using historical events as models that were then compressed temporally through a series of
interactions supported by, or not contraindicated by current scientific understanding. These best-guess events were then rig-
orously tested through event modeling, either through historic trend analysis, climate modeling or independent expert qual-
itative interviews. The end result is one, or a set, of narratives that bring a set of events together to generate a plausible
impact. Experts judged this scenario to be considerably more probable than 1 in 200 year annual average return. Hypothet-
ical scenario effects take place within one calendar year, the format used by the insurance sector.
The agricultural production shock scenario presented in this paper affects multiple growing regions within an annual
cycle, reducing yields of four major commodity crops – maize, wheat, rice, and soybean. The magnitude of each crop produc-
tion shock was based upon de-trended historical FAO production data from 1961–2013, which was used to collate a modular
‘‘library” of different past production shocks of different classes and magnitudes. Three de-trending approaches were
employed in the R statistical software package (linear regression, polynomial regression, and Friedman’s SuperSmoother
(Friedman, 1984) to normalize country-level and global production data against shifts in crop area, yield, technological
improvements, and other factors. The midpoints of the range of reduction in production across the three de-trending
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nario (Fig. 1).
Production shocks to each individual crop presented within this scenario – wheat, rice, maize and soybean – are equal or
smaller than detrended maxima within the past 50 years (Table 1). Biotic crop yield reductions were set from expert con-
sultations and the literature.
Selected historical modules of dispersed meteorological phenomena under an El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) warm
phase that were not contraindicated, and that mirrored historical global teleconnections affecting precipitation and temper-
ature across multiple agricultural regions within the same year were compiled. The ENSO is a primary driver of global
weather variability with significant effects upon agricultural production (Adams et al., 1999; Dilley and Heyman, 1995;
Hansen et al., 1998; Parthasarathy et al., 1987; Ropelewski and Halpert, 1987; Zubair, 2002). Although prediction of
ENSO-mediated teleconnections and weather variability is still limited (Joseph and Nigam, 2006; Trenberth and Fasullo,
2012; Turner and Annamalai, 2012), there is some understanding of the more reliable weather effects such as dryness in cen-
tral and peninsular India, moisture in northern Argentina and the United States, and dry conditions in Australia. Conse-
quently, an ENSO teleconnective framework was employed to build the scenario.
Historical responses to past agricultural production shocks set a baseline for the political and economic responses in the
scenario placed within the political context of the present day. Past events served as benchmarks for scenario price shocks,
financial system impacts, and geopolitical ramifications within current global parameters of trade, currency, foreign affairs,
food reserves, and other factors. The impact on financial variables is highly uncertain for a future event, depending on cur-
rent market sentiment, individual behavior, precise relative timing of events and other factors in markets including policy,
such as the scale of government intervention including the impact of quantitative easing (QE). We assessed the financial
impacts of the food shocks in 1973/4 (which occurred alongside an oil price shock), the 2008 food price shock and the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on equities, sovereign risk (Kraemer, 2014), stock markets, US Treasury bonds, corporate
bond yields and gold.
Expert review and consultation provided key insight and commentary into the plausibility and magnitude of each sce-
nario component. Experts were instructed to note any contraindications and to indicate whether they believed the scenario
as a whole to be ‘‘plausible yet extreme.” More than twenty leading experts in relevant fields served as reviewers. In multiple
cases, outside expert opinion led to the removal and/or alteration of scenario components. Knock-on responses, the plausible1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
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Fig. 1. Historical USA maize production data (FAO) with three trendlines: linear regression, polynomial regression, and Friedman’s SuperSmoother. The
average of the three lines was used to de-trend production data to quantify year-to-year variability and historical production shocks.
Table 1
Crop production shock magnitudes, by crop, under the scenario with major contributing factors and historical maximum crop production shocks from 1960–
2013 (FAO data), shock year, and major contributing factors to those historical shocks.
Crop Scenario shock Contributing factors Historical max Year Contributing factors
Maize 10% USA flood 18% 1983 USA drought
Rice 7% India, SE Asia drought 8% 2002 India drought
Wheat 7% Drought, rust 10% 2003 Low China prod, heat
Soy 11% USA flood, rust 17% 1991 Brazil production shortfall
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and Aviva. Each involved approximately 10 experts from the insurance, investment and actuarial professions. These work-
shops held in late 2014 and early 2015 presented initial findings of the scenario and plausible responses during which speci-
fic aspects of the scenario was adjusted to reflect consensus on the likely scale of impact. The scenario was finalized
immediately following these workshops, therefore some projections for markets or the geo-political background have chan-
ged. To be relevant to the insurance sector, the scenario is set in the immediate future (a 2016 scenario).
3. Results
The basic outcomes of the scenario are presented in Table 2. For a more in-depth explanation of the meteorological foun-
dations of the scenario, political and economic effects, see Maynard (2015). The combined impacts of the scenario agricul-
tural production shocks result in global crop production declines of 10% for maize, 11% for soy, 7% for wheat and 7% for rice.
As a result, quadrupled commodity prices and commodity stock fluctuations, coupled with civil unrest, cause significant neg-
ative humanitarian consequences and major financial losses worldwide.
Wheat, maize and soybean prices increase to quadruple the levels seen around 2000. Rice prices increase 500% as India
starts to try to buy from smaller exporters following restrictions imposed by Thailand. Public agricultural commodity
stocks increase 100% in share value, agricultural chemical stocks rise 500% and agriculture engineering supply chain
stocks rise 150%. Food riots break out in urban areas across the Middle East, North Africa and Latin America. The euro
weakens and the main European stock markets lose 10% of their value; US stock markets follow and lose 5% of their value.
[Maynard (2015).]4. Discussion
A major global agricultural production shock will, with certainty, generate an array of impacts of great significance to
humanity. The scenario described in this paper is a tool that results from a structured dialog between the academic scientific
community and those responsible for assessing emerging risks to insured assets and insurance capital. This tool is specifi-
cally relevant to pricing, potential regulatory and other actions on the part of insurers and reinsurers, but a major agricultural
production shock would also likely have major effects on governments, potential conflict and unrest, vulnerable and food
insecure populations, NGO and aid workers, farmers, and the financial sector. While it is very difficult to predict agricultural
production shocks and their ramifications, this work provides a plausible view of a suite of vulnerabilities of global food sys-
tems. This scenario has catalyzed and furthered scientific, regulatory, and public policy decisions and discussions of adap-
tation to and mitigation of such shocks, and approaches to better value risk avoided.Table 2
Crop production shock factors in the scenario, and global production shocks by crop (Maynard, 2015).
Shock Description Crop
affected
Location Timing
Asian soybean rust Virulent strain expands from Brazil into
Argentina after a warm winter
Soybean Argentina, Brazil January–June
Mississippi river
flood
Winter snows and spring rains flood
Mississippi and Missouri rivers
Maize Midwest United States February–May
Wheat stem rust UG99 stem rust expands further from Middle
East
Wheat West Asia, Russia, India January–June
India drought Strong drought reminiscent of events in 2002 Rice, wheat South Asia June–December
South Asia flood Torrential rains in the region cause flooding in
affected areas
Rice Nepal, Bangladesh, Northeast India,
Pakistan
June–December
Southeast Asia
drought
Variations in monsoonal patterns cause
precipitation shortfalls
Rice Southeast Asia June–December
Australia drought Strong droughts in wheat producing areas Wheat Eastern and Southeastern Australia June–December
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grain crop yield lost in a single year. These production shocks often, but not always, lead to export shocks and price shocks.
Past price shocks for major grains have varied from 100% to 200% increases or higher. A production shock becomes a global
supply shock if trade and export restrictions result.
There are a number of factors that influence how individuals, organizations and countries respond to an agricultural pro-
duction shock. Immediate short-term responses include export or customs restrictions, speculation, contract defaults and
preferential trade agreements, loss of critical infrastructure for export, management of food stocks, land use changes and
black market response. Longer term amplifying or mitigating factors can include issues more directly associated with the
food system, such as the level of global food stocks (Wright, 2009), yet they often relate to indirect economic factors such
as the strength of the US dollar (Headey and Fan, 2008). Inter-hemispheric crop allocation has been offered as a potential
mitigating response to agricultural shocks, as farmers in one hemisphere may see the reduction of a specific crop in the other
hemisphere and may base their planting decisions to capitalize on higher prices (Lybbert et al., 2014). However, the spread of
crops across hemispheres is not well suited to this buffering. Prior studies do not incorporate multiple crop region failures
and only investigate effects of relatively small shocks.
A key factor in whether a production shock leads to a price shock is the level of global stocks (Wright, 2009). Historically
when global stocks are low (below 80 days of global consumption), agricultural production shocks can lead to price shocks.
When global stocks are high (above 90 days of consumption), a price shock has rarely followed. In 2015, stocks were rela-
tively low. Without a strategic global response to food security, it is unlikely that they will rise. Stock management by coun-
tries is currently set out within the World Trade Organization’s Uruguay Round reform program. Many commentators have
expressed a view that the US biofuel production could be seen as a virtual stock in time of crisis, however, in general, biofuel
production increases over the last decade have led to higher food prices (Roberts and Tran, 2013)
An important aspect of food responses is the current state of political fragility (Natalini et al., 2015) and the ability to con-
trol exports or imports within a country. To reflect this, key trends in fragile states, or political trends that could lead to
increased fragility, were included in the responses considered in this scenario. Past food riots and export restrictions were
also considered because countries which have previously experienced food riots or implemented export restrictions are
more likely to repeat these in the future.
Policy makers and academics have noted an urgent need to acquire and maintain necessary data, modeling and proba-
bilistic capacities as a public good to adequately characterize and mitigate agricultural exposure and vulnerability to
extreme events and climate risks (Selvaraju, 2012) to protect against disturbance to exposed sectors and to limit potentially
disastrous consequences for the global economy and people. Accomplishing this task will require integrated and forceful
effort from researchers, industry, non-governmental and regulatory bodies, and farmers around the world. In this paper,
we highlight the importance of events that could affect multiple agricultural commodities within the same annual cycle.
Data needs are large, and gaps are significant. Modeling agricultural production shocks, and concomitant effects requires glo-
bal historical datasets for agricultural production variables, food stocks and flows, market functions, social unrest, human
health outcomes, and weather. Many of these data are unreliable, inaccessible, limited in time horizon, or simply unavail-
able. Utilizing and synthesizing extant data is difficult and labor intensive due to format and metadata inconsistencies, diver-
gent scales and scopes, and lack of data persistence.
Data integration and sharing through conflation, semantic ontologies, consistent metadata standards, open access and
institutional partnership would improve the ability to conduct large-scale analyses and transdisciplinary model building
with greater accuracy and effectiveness, and should be prioritized for investment (Andelman et al., 2004; Athanasiadis
et al., 2009; Fegraus et al., 2005; Macario and Medeiros, 2009; Madin et al., 2008; Michener, 2006; Rosenzweig et al.,
2013; Ruiz et al., 2011). The National Database for Flora and Fauna (NDFF) (Veen et al., 2012), the Agricultural Model Inter-
comparison and Improvement Project (AGMIP) (Rosenzweig et al., 2013; von Lampe et al., 2014), the Group on Earth Obser-
vations Global Agricultural Monitoring Initiative (GEOGLAM) (Whitcraft et al., 2015), and the Human Genome Project
(Collins et al., 2003) have grappled with relevant data coordination and management problems, and provide insight into
ways forward given adequate scientific and donor support. Existing efforts should be expanded, such as building on the
efforts of the National Integrated Drought Information System (NIDIS) to create a global drought and water monitoring por-
tal, or adapting the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) approach to create an early warning system for
global agricultural conditions. The soil is a complex and hidden underpinning of our agricultural productivity, and so have
been soil data. With the advent of new analytical approaches, various forms of sensing and strong global collaboration (e.g.,
GlobalSoilMap and the Global Soil Partnership), new, simplified and functional forms of soil data are being built and made
available for integration with data on the other elements of our ecosystems and societies (Arrouays et al., 2014; Vaysse and
Lagacherie, 2015). This approach should be replicated with other agricultural data streams and integrated. Expanding upon
other national resources such as USDA’s World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates, combined with data from private
sector and/or financial industry information, would improve scientific and market understanding of agricultural stocks and
flows. Integrating the efforts of separate but related programs, such as AGMIP and GEOGLAM, should be encouraged, com-
mended, and expanded upon. It would be advantageous to create collaborative, pre-competitive spaces and knowledge sys-
tems capable of addressing agricultural futures. Amenable policy environments, public-private collaborations such as
exemplified in this study, and prioritization of research funding to focus on the study of dynamics and conditions that could
produce and result from multiple breadbasket failure are imperative.
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specific events affecting agricultural systems. Improved capacity to model plausible tail risk, and the shifts in tail risk due to
climate change, extreme events and other pressures, will be necessary to better describe the probability of agricultural pro-
duction shocks now and in the future. The above scenario provides a foundation for future studies that assess probabilities
more precisely than the 1-in-200 benchmark used in this approach. Given limited data, high rates of change in agriculture
and climate, and the lack of records of crop losses and indirect insurance claims in much of the world, concerted focus and
innovative approaches to sensitivities of risk projections will be essential to advance our capability to describe and manage
these risks.
As data tools become more available, there will then be an increasing need for a coordinated response by the ‘user’ com-
munity to create knowledge transfer channels to move relevant information into decision-making processes and provide
relevant data back to the scientific communities. Some examples of these types of programs include the ARISE initiative
for disaster risk-sensitive investments, the 1-in-100 initiative to integrate risks into the financial system, IIASA’s GLOBIOM
land use model (Ermolieva et al., 2015), and IFPRI’s IMPACT model array (Rosegrant and IMPACT Development Team, 2012).
An especially important priority for future work will be to integrate impacts of agricultural climate risk upon smallholder
farmers and other highly vulnerable populations, whowould not be appropriately represented under analyses of financial sys-
tem shocks and insurance liabilities. Agricultural climate risk is composed of more than simply production risk, posing haz-
ards to input suppliers, intermediaries, processors, marketers, and consumers (Hill and Pittman, 2012). Future risk analyses
must better account for this. When including societal and ecological events in combination, it is likely that multiple method-
ologies will be required where automated approaches to data and model management could be revolutionary. For example, a
scenario may utilize climate models to predict short-term weather events, which then cascade into risks of broader societal
effects that may be more difficult to quantify directly such as market responses, or potential for terrorist acts.
Uncommon partnerships between researchers, industry, government and media provide a method to leverage the long
reach of agricultural and food system risks towards motivating new scientific knowledge and risk management solutions.
Such partnerships also offer a different model of engaging the public with academic inquiry. Lloyd’s of London’s collaborative
leadership in investigating agricultural climate risk with this academic team has spurred further collaborations with other
private sector partners, energized focus on scientific and technical gaps and possible solutions, and has spurred the broader
re/insurance and financial industries to actively engage with these risks. Other sectors such as pensions, ‘‘big agriculture,”
infrastructure, retail, development aid, environmental and human rights communities would benefit from similar partner-
ships to explore their specific exposures to agricultural climate risk.
5. Conclusions
To prepare for increasingly severe agricultural risks in the future potentially amplified through extremely efficient and
therefore fragile, intensely interconnected food systems, scientific, business, civil society, national and global governance
communities will need to work together. This scenario suggests that significant multiple-crop agricultural production shocks
are plausible and could have major impacts upon society. The scenario is structured to push industry and academia to more
rigorously evaluate current understanding and management of agricultural climate risk, recognize exposure to those risks,
and to incentivize risk mitigation. The insurance sector is in a strong position to expand the recognition of agricultural cli-
mate risks to society as a whole far beyond the traditional narrow frame of crop insurance, and to offer metrics and tools to
begin to account for interacting and more systemic risks and uncertainties. Improved reflections of these vulnerabilities, will
be essential for more timely and accurate responses to food system shocks, and the ability to make better decisions, espe-
cially in an anticipatory mode, concerning food system risk. Agriculture and therefore humanity faces unprecedented chal-
lenges at extreme scales in the next several years to decades. The scientific community, along with all industries and
stakeholders who are vulnerable, should prioritize improved capacity to characterize and manage agricultural climate risk
and its humanitarian, economic and environmental dimensions.
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